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One key debate in memory research centers around the problem of representation. How
is information represented in memory and how do the principles that govern memory
representations change across the short and long term? One class of memorymodels (e.g., Baddeley
and Hitch, 1974) characterized separate memory stores for information represented over the
short-term from those of more permanent and durable long-term representations. More recent
approaches (Cowan, 2001; Oberauer, 2002; McElree, 2006) on the other hand, have distinguished
memory representations based on distinct activation levels, or states, rather than specialized stores.
For decades researchers have assessed the interactions and dissociations across memory systems
and representational states using behavioral investigations, seeking for the key principles that
govern them. Recent advances in neuroscience have provided the field with a new set of tools
that can be employed to complement and extend previous efforts by means of assessing the
corresponding underlying neural mechanisms. In an effort to move toward a more unified
perspective, this research topic brought together a collection of empirical, theoretical and review
articles that collectively advance our understanding of representational states in memory, as well as
bear the potential to reconcile some of the differences across the models.
LaRocque et al. (2014) provide an influential review of the state-based memory models along
with an overview of recent efforts to disentangle the hypothesized states utilizing both univariate
and multivariate analysis of neural data associated with them. They highlight the inferential
advantage of the multivariate approach in providing a more direct test for the critical predictions of
the theoretical models due to their sensitivity to the information contained in distributed patterns
of neural activity.
Nee and Jonides (2013) propose a descriptive neural account that incorporates the recent neural
findings with respect to the neural correlates of distinct representational states. In addition to
presumably being a precedent of a computational neural model distinguishing the layers/states
of memory, this account provides a reconciliation of some of the discrepancies observed in recent
neural findings and those of traditionally held views of short-term memory (STM) and long-term
memory (LTM). Most notably, the account attempts to address the involvement of the medial
temporal lobes (MTL) for the intermediate representational state (direct access region), between
the focus of attention (FoA) and LTM. In this account, MTL is hypothesized to provide the
item-context bindings that form the basis of this representational state. They also suggest that
MTL-coordinated neural firing during the maintenance of information in STM leads to new LTM.
Based on his theoretical account, Oberauer (2013) has introduced a computational model in
an attempt to resolve a key debate in the literature, namely the limit of the current FoA. The
computational model is applied to several data sets that have reported inconsistent results. The
model shows that some of these discrepancies can be explained by accounting for the specific
retrieval operation deployed to access representations from memory, namely whether the memory
search is carried out in parallel or serial.
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Beaudry et al. (2014) question the necessity of the FoA as a
unique representational state in memory assessing a behavioral
prediction proposed by some researchers, namely that it should
be immune to proactive interference (PI) effects inmemory. They
review studies in which immunity to PI failed to hold for items
residing in the current FoA. They suggest that the relevancy of
the contents of focal attention to the task at hand is a key factor
for determining whether immunity to PI will be observed. This
notable investigation questions the reliance on single measures
to understand and distinguish the hypothesized representational
states and/or memory systems.
Yee et al. (2014) assess memory performance of amnesic
patients on a short-term change detection task that required
item-location relationships. This design extends their previous
work by ensuring the task demands did not exceed working
memory capacity limits. Results from two experiments indicate
that amnesic patients were impaired despite a short delay and the
absence of intervening items between study and test. A critical
question that remains to be tested is whether this impairment
is specific to spatial relationships or a more global deficit in
relational memory processes.
Morrison et al. (2014) evaluate howmemory performance and
neural activation indices change across temporal order memory
judgments depending on whether the task emphasized earlier
or later members of the study list. Primacy and recency effects
shifted with the manipulation of the task demands, with larger
recency effects observed during blocks of judgments of recency,
and larger primacy effects during blocks of judgments of primacy.
Their data also complements previous research suggesting that
the indices of FoA can change depending on the task demands
and the strategy employed. For example, when rehearsal is not
possible, FoA usually corresponds to the most recent item on
a study list, but might switch across items during rehearsal
(McElree, 2006) or serial memory search operations (McElree
and Dosher, 1993; Öztekin et al., 2009).
So far, we have focused on findings that relate to accessing
episodic (e.g., list membership) information from memory.
Elhalal et al. (2014) have introduced a computational account
of the role of the prefrontal cortex in semantic relatedness and
semantic isolation. Through experiments andmodel simulations,
they show that the magnitude of the Von Restorff effect (better
memory for semantic isolates) and semantic clustering were
correlated with fluid intelligence, a measure that has been shown
to be mediated by the prefrontal cortex. The computational
model Categorization-Activation-Novelty (CAN) was able to
account for both effects.
We conclude by highlighting several venues for future
research. Recent advances in neuroscience now enable powerful
approaches that combine behavioral indices along with
complementary neuroscience methods that can utilize univariate
and multivariate analyses of neuroimaging data on healthy
individuals, as well as transcranial magnetic stimulation and
lesion studies to test and infer similarities and dissociations
across the hypothesized states of memory. The literature would
benefit from computational memory models that can account
for the recent neural findings (e.g., the contribution of the
MTL to both STM and LTM). A more in-depth investigation
of the neural correlates of the FoA is also warranted. Recent
neuroimaging work has implicated the posterior parietal cortex
and the lateral inferior temporal cortex (Öztekin et al., 2010;
Nee and Jonides, 2011). Transcranial magnetic stimulation and
patient studies could test whether these regions uniquely support
successful execution of memory judgments pertaining to the
FoA. Future neuroimaging studies could also take advantage
of multivariate pattern analysis of distributed neural activity
to directly track whether encoded material corresponding
to a hypothesized memory state is distinctly represented
in the brain. Finally, we should note that verbal and visual
working memory studies have yielded inconsistent findings
with respect to the capacity limits of FoA (though see Cowan
et al., 2014). Future behavioral and neural work investigating
the underlying factors for this discrepancy would also be
worthwhile.
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